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The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed that the future dangerous-
ness aggravating factor had been established. In reaching that conclu-
sion, the court relied on "other crimes" evidence including vandalism
and petit larceny. In reality, such non-violent crimes have no bearing
upon the defendant's propensity to commit violent crimes in the fu-
ture. 18 It is desirable to contest the relevancy of evidence offered in
support of future dangerousness. Objections at trial, or pretrial motions
18 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) states in relevant part that: "The
penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability based upon
evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense of which he is accused that he
in limine are appropriate vehicles for excluding any irrelevant evidence,
including that which is irrelevant to the existence of aggravating fac-
tors. 19
Summary and analysis by:
Mari Karen Simmons
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continu-
ing threat to society..." (emphasis added).
19 See Fenn, Anything Someone Else Says Can and Will be Used
Against You in a Court ofLaw: The Use of UnadjudicatedActs in Capital
Sentencing, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 31 (1993).
DUBOIS v. COMMONWEALTH
435 S.E. 2d 636 (Va. 1993)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Johnile L. Dubois and three other men sought to rob a convenience
store in Portsmouth, Virginia. Only the defendant was armed with a gun.
He immediately fired at Shari Watson, a store employee, barely missing
her head. Another of the robbers ordered the two remaining employees,
both male, to open the cash register. Philip Council, suffering from
neurological problems, could not open the register quickly. The defen-
dant shot Council in the chest, killing him, and left with $400 in cash.
Dubois pleaded guilty to five charges, including capital murder,
pursuant to an agreement with the Commonwealth that it would not seek
the death penalty. Dubois testified that he understood the charges against
him and that the trial court could impose the death penalty. The
Commonwealth summarized its evidence against him, and Dubois
reaffirmed his plea. The trial court ordered a pre-sentence report.
At the sentencing hearing the defendant stated that he had read the
pre-sentence report and had understood it. He neither questioned the
author of the report nor presented any evidence in mitigation. The
defense attorney stated that the record did not support imposition of the
death penalty, and the Commonwealth informed the court that it was not
seeking the death penalty. The Commonwealth did request the longest
sentence available.
The trial judge sentenced the defendant to death based on a finding
of future dangerousness. The trial judge based this finding on several
factors, including the report of the physician who examined Dubois for
competency to stand trial and sanity at the time of the offense. Dubois
appealed and challenged the trial court's imposition of the death penalty.
Dubois asserted that his criminal record was the sole basis for the trial
court's finding of future dangerousness and that it did not sufficiently
support the finding because he had been convicted of only a single act of
physical violence.
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Dubois's contention and
upheld the conviction and sentence. The court conceded that the prior
convictions were not extensive but found that the evidence of the crimes
"reveal[s] Dubois's prior activities in closer detail."1 Specifically, the
court noted the probation officer's statement in the pre-sentence report
that the defendant had been involved in an attempted murder, was selling
drugs, and had been charged with other crimes that were nolle prossed.
The court also mentioned the examining doctor's finding of anti-social
tendencies and the defendant's ringleader role in the robbery. The court
found that Dubois's role in the robbery showed a marked disregard for
human life. The court summed up its impression of Dubois with the
statement that "[hie engaged in criminal activity as if it were a commer-
cial enterprise."
2
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that, although the trial court
"was obliged to consider" the Commonwealth's agreement not to seek
the death penalty as a factor in its decision, the court was not bound to
accept its recommendation. 3 The court further held that on appeal the
Commonwealth could present its evaluations and conclusions regarding
sufficiency of the evidence to support a death sentence, notwithstanding
its plea agreement. In addition to denying Dubois's appeal, the court
found that the imposition of the death penalty had no basis in passion,
prejudice, or other arbitrary factor.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
A number of important issues, most of them unrecognized or not
addressed by all parties, including the Supreme Court of Virginia, are
raised by this decision.
I. Lankford v. Idaho
The fact situation in Dubois is very similar to that found inLankford
v. Idaho4 and raises issues virtually identical to those raised in that case-
fundamental issues concerning notice and opportunity to defend against
1 Dubois v. Commonwealth, 435 S.E. 2d 636, 638 (Va. 1993).
2 Id. at 639.
3 Id.
4 111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991).
5 Id. at 1733 (emphasis added).
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evidence to be used in support of a death sentence, as well as opportunity
to present evidence in mitigation. In Lankford, the United States
Supreme Court examined a situation similar to that presented in Dubois
and stated that "[p]etitioner's lack of adequate notice that the judge was
contemplating the imposition of the death sentence created an imper-
missible risk that the adversary process may have malfunctioned in
this case."5 In Lankford, a silent judge listened to arguments about
sentencing length and never indicated that the real issue was whether or
not to impose the death sentence. The Court held that the defendant and
his counsel did not have adequate notice that the judge might impose the
death penalty; therefore, the sentencing process did not satisfy Four-
teenth Amendment due process requirements.
6
In Dubois, there was a similar risk that the adversary system
malfunctioned. There may be meaningful distinctions supporting the
conclusion of the Supreme Court of Virginia,7 but it is amazing that the
due process limitations imposed by Lankford are not even discussed in
Dubois.
II. Improper and Untested Evidence
In sentencing Dubois to death, the trial judge considered improper
and untested evidence. The Commonwealth offered a summary of the
evidence that itcould have shown at trial. None of this evidence had been
tested in an adversary setting.
The evidence considered was not only unreliable, but some of it was
also irrelevant. The judge mentioned charges against the defendant that
had been nolle prossed. A trial judge, however, cannot presume the
defendant guilty of charges of which he was not convicted. Indeed, in
Johnson v. Mississippi,8 the United States Supreme Court held that the
prosecutor could not use a reversed conviction as a basis for a death
sentence because the defendant still had the presumption of innocence.
The trial judge also considered the statement of the probation officer in
the presentence report that Dubois had said that he made his living selling
drugs. No evidence presented had been adversarially tested in a court of
law. In addition to issues concerning the reliability of such a statement,
the relevance of selling drugs to a propensity to commit serious acts of
violence that constitute a continuing danger is tenuous or non-existent.
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial judge "did not
impose the death sentence based on passion, prejudice or any other
arbitrary factor."9 The trial judge's statement, however, that "[y]ou are
26 years of age and you have nine children already, not supporting a
one,"' 0 indicates his moral distaste for the defendant rather than a belief
that non-support is relevant to future dangerousness.
III. Use of Defendant's Statements To Doctor
To Establish Future Dangerousness
A. Scope of the Examination
The examining physician had no authority to evaluate Dubois for
future dangerousness. The doctor examined Dubois under Virgina Code
6 Id. at 1731.
7 In Lankford, the statute gave the defendant notice that he could
be sentenced to death in spite of the plea agreement. Idaho Code § 19-
2515 (1987). In Dubois, the judge asked the defendant in open court if
he understood that he could be sentenced to death.
8 486 U.S. 578, 586 (1988).
9 Dubois, 435 S.E. 2d at 639.
10 Id. at 640.
11 245 Va. 222,427 S.E.2d 394 (1993).
12 Id. at 243, 427 S.E.2d at 407-08.
13 Id. (citing Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 544, 391
section19.2-169.5 which states the duty of the physician is only to
"evaluate the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense..." The doctor
also evaluated the defendant pursuant to Virginia Code sectionl9.2-
169.1 (D) which states that the physician should evaluate and report "(i)
the defendant's capacity to understand the proceedings against him; (ii)
his ability to assist his attorney; and (iii) his need for treatment in the
event he is found incompetent." Neither statute makes any reference to
an analysis for any future tendencies much less the specific finding of
future dangerousness.
InStewartv. Commonwealth,1 I the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that an expert appointed to conduct a reciprocal examination for the
Commonwealth under the authority of Virginia Code sectionl9.2-264.3:1,
after the defendant gives notice of intent to use a neutral mitigation expert
at a capital penalty trial, may examine for future dangerousness. 12 The
court's decision rested upon the assumption that this statute made the
physician an expert for the Commonwealth, acting against the defendant's
interests. 13 In contrast, nothing about Virginia Code section19.2-169.5
or section19.2-169.1 makes the examining physician partisan to either
side. Therefore, the scope of the examination in Dubois and its use
clearly exceeded the boundaries of these statutes.
B. Use of Incriminating Statements
The use of the defendant's statements against him in the sentencing
proceeding violated the mandate set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Estelle v. Smith.14 In Estelle, the Court held that a defendant
should have been given Miranda warnings prior to his examination in
order to use subsequent, incriminating statements against him.15 Dubois
was not warned about the possible use of his statements here. The
utilization of these statements, without prior warning, compromised the
defendant's Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination.
C. Notice
In addition to the apparent deficiencies in the scope of the examina-
tion and the lack of warnings given, the Supreme Court of Virginia's
opinion does not indicate that the defense counsel received any notice
that the defendant would be examined for future dangerousness. In
Satterwhite v. Texas,16 the United States Supreme Court held that an
examining physician must give notice to defense counsel that he intends
to evaluate future dangerousness. 17 Without this notice, the prosecution
cannot use the conclusion of future dangerousness against the defendant.
The Court reemphasized this premise in Powell v. Texas.18
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in Stewart, held that notice suffi-
cientto satisfy Virginia Code sectionl 9.2-264.3:1 satisfies Sattenthite.19
However questionable that holding may be,20 it has no relevance to
Dubois who was not examined under sectionl9.2-264.3:l. The lack of
notice given to Dubois casts additional doubt on the constitutionality of
the medical evidence considered by the trial court in support of future
dangerousness.
S.E.2d 276, 281-82 (1990)).
14 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
15 Id. at 467.
16 486 U.S. 249 (1988). See case summary of Satterwhite, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 14 (1988).
17 Id. at 254.
18 492 U.S. 680 (1989). See case summary of Powell, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 9 (1989).
19 Stewart, 245 Va. at 243,427 S.E.2d at 408.
20 See case summary of Stewart, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
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IV. Why did this disaster happen?
It is difficult to see a case like this without wondering why such a
travesty occurred. The first possibility is ineffective assistance of
counsel. The defense attorney made no objections to the pre-sentence
report nor did he question the probation officer. He did not offer any
evidence in mitigation.21 Another explanation is that the defense
attorney neither made objections nor presented evidence for fear of
breaching his plea bargain agreement.
22
21 Defense counsel did raise Eighth Amendment objections in
order to preserve the Lankford issue and other federal issues. The
Supreme Court of Virginia said that these issues were defaulted because
counsel did not argue them and did not move to withdraw the plea. It
remains to be seen whether these issues were actually defaulted.
22 See Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987) (holding that the
V. Lessons
Defense attorneys will want to be very careful in the future not to
plead guilty to capital murder without formal or strong informal assur-
ance from a judge that the defendant will receive a sentence less than
death. Still, it should be possible to achieve the goals of a Common-
wealth/Dubois agreement if the Commonwealth is firm that it is offering
no evidence of aggravating factors.
23
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state could seek death penalty in subsequent proceeding if the defendant
breaches the plea agreement).
23 See, e.g. Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 427 S.E.2d
411 (1993) (finding evidence of aggravating factor insufficient) and case
summary of Beavers, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
CHABROL v. COMMONWEALTH
245 Va. 327, 427 S.E.2d 374 (1993)
MURPHY v. COMMONWEALTH
246 Va. 136, 431 S.E.2d 48 (1993)
Supreme Court of Virginia
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Virginia examined two cases and
offered guidelines about what arguments the Virginia courts will hear
after a defendant has pled guilty to capital murder. This summary will
examine each case individually and then attempt to draw broader
implications from the aggregate of the two opinions.
FACTS AND HOLDINGS
I. Chabrol v. Commonwealth
Andrew J. Chabrol and his accomplice, Stanley Berkeley, abducted
Melissa Harrington on her way to work. The victim was a married co-
worker of Chabrol's to whom he had previously made sexual proposi-
tions. After tying her to a bed and repeatedly sexually assaulting her,
Chabrol manually strangled Harrington, tied a rope around her neck,
wrapped her face in duct tape and enveloped her head in a plastic bag.
Medical testimony indicated that Harrington died as a result of the
strangulation and suffocation. After police arrested Chabrol for the
murder, they searched his personal belongings and found a computer
disk and diaries that contained detailed entries of Chabrol's plans to
murder Harrington. A search of Chabrol's home revealed two five-
gallon containers of gasoline. Chabrol planned, according to the diary,
to use the gasoline and powdered magnesium to burn Harrington's body
at a temperature high enough to obliterate all traces of the body.
Chabrol pleaded guilty to capital murder. After the judge sentenced
him to death, the defendant elected not to exercise his appeal of right.
Virginia law, however, requires that "[a] sentence of death, upon the
judgment thereon becoming final in the circuit court, shall be reviewed
on the record by the Supreme Court." This opinion is the result of that
review. Virginia Code section 17-110.1 establishes theguidelines forthe
Supreme Court of Virginia's mandatory review of the sentence of death:
The court shall consider and determine:
1. whether the sentence of death was imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor;
and
2. whether the sentence of death is excessive or dispro-
portionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, consider-
ing both the crime and the defendant.2
The court quickly dispensed with the first part of the review, stating
that they found "no indication that the trial court's decision was affected
by passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor." 3 The opinion also
noted that Chabrol made no contentions to the contrary.
The court next addressed Chabrol's argument that the evidence did
not support the trial court's vileness determination. The court first
looked to the applicable Virginia statute which states that:
[A] sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the
court.. .shall (1) after consideration of the past criminal record
of convictions of the defendant, find ... that his conduct in
committing the offense for which he stands charged was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery
to the victim; and (2) recommend that the penalty of death be
imposed.4
1 Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1 (1990).
2 Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1(C) (1990).
3 Chabrol v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 327, 334,427 S.E.2d 374,
377 (1993).
4 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1990).
